RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CIVIL PROCEDURE: DISCHARGE OF A
SOCIAL WORKER FAILS TO SUPPORT 1343(3)
JURISDICTION UNDER PERSONALPROPERTY RIGHTS TEST
In Tichon v. Harder1 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that a social worker's claim that her discharge from a state job
lacked procedural due process failed to state a cause of action under
section 1983 of title 422 and section 1343(3) of title 28, 3 since no right
of personal liberty was at stake. The plaintiff, who planned to become
a psychiatric social worker, began work with the Connecticut
Department of Welfare on a probationary status. .Her supervisor
recommended dismissal at the end of a six-month trial period, rating
her performance as mediocre and her judgment as poor. The plaintiff
was dismissed, and her efforts to appeal to the program supervisor
were fruitless. She sued in federal court under section 1983 on the
grounds that failure to give notice of the imminent termination, lack
of an impartial evaluation of her work, and absence of a hearing for
rebuttal of her supervisor's critique violated procedural due process.
On the theory that due process does not require a formal hearing and
the right to appeal a probationary employee's dismissal, the district
court dismissed the complaint but did not treat the issue of civil rights
jurisdiction. 4 Relying primarily on the personal rights-property rights
test of Hague v. C10 5 and its recent evaluation of that test in Eisen v.
Eastman,6 the Second Circuit concluded that the alleged lack of
1. 438 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1971).

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation'of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.

3. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964), is the jurisdictional counterpart to the section 1983 cause of
action. For the text of section 1343(3) see note 10 infra.
4. 438 F.2d at 1398-99.
5. 307 U.S. 496,531 (1939) (Stone, J., concurring).
6. 421 F.2d560 (2d Cir. 1969).
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procedural due process did not state a cause of action cognizable

under section 1983.
The personal rights-property rights distinction has survived a
troublesome history since the Hague decision. The plaintiffs in Hague
obtained an injunction under the predecessors of sections 1983 and
1343(3) against municipal officials refusing to allow a union to hold
organizational meetings. 7 The concurring opinion of Justice Stone8
focused on the reconciliation of two jurisdictional provisions, sections
13319 and 1343(3)10 of title 28. Stone concluded that section 1331 was
the proper jurisdictional basis whenever a dollar value could be placed
on the subject matter and that section 1343(3) provided jurisdiction
only when the "right asserted is inherently incapable of monetary
valuation."" The now familiar test emerged as:
whenever the right or immunity is one of personal liberty not dependent for its
existence upon the infringement of property rights, there is jurisdiction in the
district court under [section 1343(3)] to entertain it without proof that the
amount in controversy exceeds the requisite amount.' 2

While the personal-property right distinction seems clear enough on
its face, serious problems arise in its application.' 3 The primary
reason for difficulties is that the loss of property so often affects
personal interests. As the cases after Hague have shown, state
deprivation of rights traditionally considered to be property rights,
such as one's home or job, carries with it an inconvenience and loss of
dignity often as onerous and hard to value as the state's abridgment of
7. 307 U.S. at 507-08.
8. Mr. Justice Roberts also wrote an opinion in Hague, which rested on the privileges and
immunities clause of the 14th amendment, and argued that section 1343(3) provided jurisdiction
over the loss of rights within that clause. Id. at 518.
9. The section provides in pertinent part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interests and
costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a) (1964).
10. This section provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person:. . .(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of
any state law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any rights, privilege, or
immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within thejurisdiction of the United
States. Id. § 1343(3).
1I. 307 U.S. at 530.
12. Id. at 531-32.
13. See Note, Section 1343(3) Jurisdictionand the Property-PersonalRight Distinction,
1970 Durr L.J. 819, 824.
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one's right to free speech or peaceable assembly." In Douglas v. City
of Jeannette'5 the Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction under section
1343(3) of an appeal from the criminal prosecution of Jehovah's
Witnesses for soliciting without a license. Justice Stone noted that the
alleged infringement of free speech was sufficient for civil rights
jurisdiction, a position that would appear consistent with his Hague
formula. Yet, according to the facts in Douglas, the city objected to
the sale of materials by the Jehovah's Witnesses, not their mere
distribution. Thus, the complaint was in essence for the loss of a
property right-the potential sales of the literature. This right,
however, was closely allied with their interests in freedom of
expression. The subtleties involved in this sort of analysis explain why
recent cases indicate a desire to avoid the Stone approach in Hague.16
In two Fifth Circuit cases 17 involving denial of applications for liquor
licenses, plaintiffs, using 1343(3) as a basis for jurisdiction, claimed a
denial of due process since no standards existed to measure the merits
of their applications. The court found section 1343(3) jurisdiction in
both cases without discussing the personal-property rights
distinction. 8 In these circumstances, it is difficult to find anything
other than the loss of a property right, except perhaps the loss of the
right to carry on one's chosen business. Amidst such uncertainty, the
distinction between property interests and personal interests begins to
rest on verbalization instead of logic. The Second Circuit appeared
wary of this dilemma in Eisen v. Eastman19 although it refused to find
section 1343(3) jurisdiction on a claim that a municipal rent control
law had deprived the complaining landlord of due process rights by
limiting the rents he could charge. The frustration is evident in the
tone of the holding:
We therefore hold, although with a good deal less than complete assurance,
that Justice Stone's Hague formulation, generously construed, should continue
to be regarded as the law of this circuit. Since the complaint here alleged only a
loss of money... jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act [is not present]. ?"
14.
15.
16.
17.

Note, The ProperScope of the Civil Rights Act. 66 HARV. L. Rav. 1285, 1289 (1953).
319 U.S. 157 (1943).
307 U.S. at 518-32.
Barnes v. Merritt, 376 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1967); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir.

1964).
18. 376 F.2d at 11; 326 F.2d at 612. Butsee Berry v. Allen, 411 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1969);
Atlanta Bowling Center, Inc. v. Alien, 389 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1968).
19. 421 F.2d at 560.
20. Id. at 566.
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Very recently the Second Circuit indicated some greater flexibility in
the area of section 1343(3) jurisdiction. In Dale v. Hahn2' plaintiff
contended that section 102 of New York's Mental Hygiene Law,
under which she had been committed as a mental incompetent,
deprived her of procedural due process and resulted in the
appropriation of her assets against her will. Disagreeing with the
lower court's characterization of this action as one involving only a
property right, the court held that all the incidents of competence were
at stake-an interest far more fundamental than a property right.2 2
The problems in delineating the boundaries of personal and
property interests are acutely present in cases challenging the
procedures used in discharge from public employment. In Birnbaum
v. Trussell2 a physician on a hospital staff was dismissed, without
notice, from his post primarily because of pressures from a hospital
union which accused the doctor of racial bias. In addition a New
York City hospital official wrote to other hospitals advising them not
to hire Dr. Birnbaum. In light of the devastating effect of this action
on the doctor's reputation and career, the Second Circuit avoided
characterization of his plight as the loss of a property interest and
instead focused on the threat to his future and the personal rights
involved. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit declined to put a price tag on the
refusal to reappoint a physician to a hospital staff in Meredith v.
Allen County War Memorial Hospital Commission,24 where section
1343(3) jurisdiction was upheld even though the basis for the firing
was general uncooperativeness, very likely less damaging than the
racial aspersions of Birnbaum. Such reasoning is not confined to the
professional employee. In Olson v. Regents a district court upheld
section 1343(3) jurisdiction where a maintenance worker with little
remaining employability 6 alleged a denial of procedural due process
after he was fired due to purported threats of assault on other
employees. In addition, a district court in Taylor v. New York City
Transit Authority27 held that the discharge of a road car inspector
21. 440 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1971).

22. Id. at 636.
23. 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966).
24. 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968).
25. 301 F. Supp. 1356 (D. Minn. 1969).

26. Petitioner was 59 years old, had worked for the university for over 14 years, and thus
had little chance for alternative employment.
27. 309 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). On appeal, the case was affirmed on other grounds.
433 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1970).
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involved an interest in personal liberty for section 1343(3) purposes
since the loss of the job and salary restricted the liberty of the
discharged inspector and his family. Although acknowledging the
Hague formula, the court's analysis that a diminution of personal
liberty stems from the loss of public employment seems to sublimate
the need to fit within the personal-property rights test. The loss to the
public servant in every one of these cases can be called a loss of
wages-a loss susceptible to valuation. Yet the courts have perceived
the rights of the public employee as a "bundle of interests" including
those of pursuing a chosen career, retaining the respect of peers, and
maintaining a minimal mobility for future jobs.Y
The focus of the Second Circuit in Tichon was twofold: whether
the rights in jeopardy are of "sufficient moment to invoke procedural
protections" and whether these rights involve elements of personal
liberty. 29 In analyzing the first aspect of this test, the court noted that
discharge from public employment presents a spectrum of potentially
injured interests varying from violations of rights secured by the first
eight amendments to rights grounded in broader elements of
procedural due process through the fourteenth amendment. Yet the
courts have been more inclined to find section 1343(3) jurisdiction to
protect a discharge imperiling the Bill of Rights' freedoms" than a
discharge procedurally unfair.3 1 In this case section 1343(3)
jurisdiction was sought on the basis of the infringement of rights
secured by general notions of due process. Without an added interest
that draws on some personal liberty, the court observed, section
1343(3) jurisdiction cannot exist within the Hague test because
"sufficient moment" is not present in property interests alone.
Turning to the second facet of this approach, the infringement of an
element of personal liberty, the Second Circuit compared Tichon's
interests to those of the physician in Birnbaum who was discharged
amidst charges of racial bias. The court found that the dismissal of
Dr. Birnbaum and the circulation of the black-list letter jeopardized
both his established professional reputation and his ability to pursue
his occupation. At stake, therefore, was not only his interest in a
28. All of the cases referred to above dealt with procedural due process rights. Where an
equal protection element exists, the further right to equal treatment arises. See, e.g., Mansell v.
Saunders, 372 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1967); Burt v. City of New York, 156 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1946).
29. 438 F.2d at 1400.
30. See, e.g., Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
31. See Taylor v. New York City Transit Auth., 309 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
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specific job but also the likely destruction of his professional career.
In this latter factor, the court saw an interest sufficiently separate
from a property right in his current salary to provide civil rights
jurisdiction. In Tichon, however, the court reasoned that the discharge
did not deprive the probationary social worker of an established
means of earning a living; it did not occur in the context of racist
accusations, and there was no wide circulation of the reasons for her
dismissal. From this comparison the Second Circuit established a test
for section 1343 (3) jurisdiction in employment cases:
Although every dismissal for reasons other than reduction in the work force
can be said to have some impact on future employability. . . in the absence of
a clear,immediate, and substantialimpact on the employee's reputation which
effectively destroys his ability to engage in his occupation, it cannot be said

that a right of personal liberty is involved.3?

Responding to plaintiffs claim that her dismissal jeopardized the
opportunity for future positions in this field and erased her
undergraduate investment in plans for graduate study, the court
pointed out that Congress did not intend that every claim of unfair
treatment by a government employee have a federal forum. Since the
adverse effects of her dismissal did not touch the elements of personal
liberty required by the Hague rule, the court concluded that section
1343(3) jurisdiction did not exist.
The effort of the court in Tichon to frame its rationale within the
Hague guidelines reveals the recurring problem faced by courts in
attempting to fit the personal rights-property rights distinction to
every situation. In light of this difficulty, the question arises whether
Justice Stone intended for his formula to control all section 1343(3)
jurisdiction issues. Since an infringement of speech and assembly was
at issue in Hague, the difficulty in valuation of the loss to plaintiffs
provided a logical explanation for the assertion of civil rights
jurisdiction. Yet, elsewhere there is evidence that Mr. Justice Stone
did not desire this formula to be applied in all cases. For instance, his
approval in Hague of the analysis in Truax v. Raich,4 where the court
allowed section 1343(3) jurisdiction to contest a ban against aliens
securing jobs, indicates his realization that some apparent property
rights cannot be easily equated with dollars and cents. The court in
Truax had characterized the right to work as "the very essence of. ..
personal freedom."' ' Perhaps Justice Stone's formula only suggested
32. 438 F.2d at 1402.
33. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
34. Id. at41.
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one reason why Congress did not require a jurisdictional amount for
civil rights complaints rather than dictating a rule for every
application of this jurisdictional provision.35 Furthermore, contrary to
Justice Stone's indication in Hague, a narrow reading of section
1343(3) jurisdiction is not necessary in order to maintain the
usefulness of the section 1331 monetary limit. Little vitality is left
after the enactment of numerous provisions for federal jurisdiction
which are exempt from the monetary requirement. 31 Moreover, a
study has shown that the abolition of the $10,000 limit would not
aggravate the problem of overcrowding in the federal system.37 Also,
the policy of guarding against federal supervision over functions
traditionally managed by the theory that section 1343(3) cannot be
used in a setting where only property interests are at stake.Y
The state cannot deprive a person of liberty or property without
due process of law.3 Section 1331 provides jurisdiction to redress the
loss of property, 40 while section 1343(3) provides jurisdiction to
redress the loss of liberty. 4' The difference in these means for redress
of rights is that Congress has imposed a jurisdictional amount in
controversy requirement of $10,000 when property rights are lost.
Parallel to this dollar minimum in the case of property rights is the
quantum requirement from Hague and Tichon that a significant
deprivation of liberty must occur to gain section 1343(3) jurisdiction.
The problems encountered in quantifying personal liberty underpin
the challenges to discharge from government employment. Some
liberty is lost whenever one is discharged from any job, yet the Tichon
court is probably correct in asserting that Congress did not intend for
every claim of denial of due process by a discharged public employee
to reach the federal courts.
The difficult, recurring question is therefore: when does
35. Although the courts do not state that Justice Stone was only suggesting a dividing line
between sections 1331 and 1343 in asserting his formula, the commentaries point to this
possibility. See, e.g., Note, The Property Rights Exception to Civil Rights
Jurisdiction-ConfusionCompounded, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1208, 1211-12 (1968).
36. See Friedenthal, New Limitationson FederalJurisdiction, II STAN. L. Rv. 213,216-17
(1959).
37. ALI Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, App. B, at
202-03 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1966).
38. 43 N.Y.U.L. Rav., supra note 35, at 1218.
39. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905).
40. See note 9 supra.
41. See note l0supra.
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termination of government employment become a significant
deprivation of liberty? A comparison of Tichon and other public
employment cases reveals factors which can be relied on to resolve this
issue. In Birnbaum and Meredith43 the courts found that section
1343 (3)jurisdiction protected the interest in an established means by
which one has maintained a livelihood. A threat to this interest by an
alleged governmental denial of procedural due process properly
supports civil rights jurisdiction. Very similar to this factor is the
Tichon problem of an interest in the capacity to establish a chosen
means of earning a living, particularly if that career is available only
in the public sector. While it is most important to protect the security
and esteem built on years of performance in a given occupation, a
total lack of due process protection for those who have invested time
and dollars in substantial preparation for a career would arguably
deter the choice of public service as a profession. This interest in
Tichon is diluted by the factor of probationary status, which has
proved so detrimental to employees seeking due process protection44
that Tichon itself is consistent with previous holdings. A much harder
case would be one where Tichon had already gained a permanent
position and had demonstrated strong reliance on job referrals
throughout the welfare system. If this setting depicts an effective
preclusion of her re-entry into the welfare profession, the employee
would have reached a zone requiring procedural safeguards. Whether
such preclusion of re-entry into a career has occurred is also affected
by the specific charges given as grounds for dismissal. As Birnbaum
and Meredith indicate, accusations damaging the reputation place a
stigma on a career, especially in a profession where a reservoir of
reputation and respect of colleagues is critical to success.45 Outside the
professions, Olson4" and Taylor47 indicate that charges implying
untrustworthiness or irresponsibility should sustain section 1343(3)
jurisdiction,' a position that the Second Circuit itself impliedly
adopted in Dale v. Hahn.4" Another significant factor from Olson is
42. See note 23 supraand accompanying text.
43. See note 24 supraand accompanying text.
44. Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
843 (1969).
45. Cf. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), where the Supreme Court

indicated that injury to reputation alone would k sufficient for section 1343(3)jurisdiction in a
proper case.
46. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
47. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
48. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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the particular employability of the claimant. Advanced age and lack
of skill in other capacities, especially when coupled with longevity in
service, combine to equate the right to remain employed with the basic
right to exist in society. These indicia only sketch a direction for
consideration in the public employment segment of civil rights
jurisdiction. While Tichon and other recent cases 49 illustrate the
Second Circuit's reluctance in applying the Hague formula,
nevertheless the continued application of this test instills an element of
uncertainty and confusion by detracting from the actual factors on
which the courts do, and should, rely. Whether the personal-property
test was intended as a rigid rule or merely an approximate dividing
line between section 1331 and section 1343(3) cases,50 it is no longer
viable. If the demise of this test requires courts to develop standards
on a case-by-case basis, the factors evident in the cases discussed
above should prove helpful in determining when a discharge from
employment without formal due process of law is a substantial
deprivation of liberty.
49. See Dale v. Hahn,..F.2d_._(2d Cir. 1971); Johnson v. Harder, 438 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.

1971).
50. 43 N.Y.U.L. REv., supra note 35, at 1217.

